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Abstract—Face morphing attacks target to circumvent Face Recognition Systems (FRS) by employing face images derived from
multiple data subjects (e.g., accomplices and malicious actors). Morphed images can verify against contributing data subjects with
a reasonable success rate, given they have a high degree of identity resemblance. The success of the morphing attacks is directly
dependent on the quality of the generated morph images. We present a new approach for generating robust attacks extending our
earlier framework for generating face morphs. We present a new approach using an Identity Prior Driven Generative Adversarial Network,
which we refer to as MIPGAN (Morphing through Identity Prior driven GAN). The proposed MIPGAN is derived from the StyleGAN with
a newly formulated loss function exploiting perceptual quality and identity factor to generate a high quality morphed face image with
minimal artifacts and with higher resolution. We demonstrate the proposed approach’s applicability to generate robust morph attacks by
evaluating it against a commercial Face Recognition System (FRS) and demonstrate the success rate of attacks. Extensive experiments
are carried out to assess the FRS’s vulnerability against the proposed morphed face generation technique on three types of data such as
digital images, re-digitized (printed and scanned) images, and compressed images after re-digitization from newly generated MIPGAN
Face Morph Dataset. The obtained results demonstrate that the proposed approach of morph generation profoundly threatens the FRS.
Index Terms—Morph Attacks, GAN, Attack detection, Face Recognition, Vulnerability, Deep Learning
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Fig. 1: Results from StyleGAN based face morphing [1] and the proposed MIPGAN (a) Contributing subject 1 (b) StyleGAN
[1] (c) Proposed method (d) Contributing subject 2
1 INTRODUCTION
Face Recognition Systems (FRS) have provided ubiquitous
way of assessing the identity and verifying the identity in
many applications. FRS have been used in everyday appli-
Haoyu Zhang and Sushma Venkatesh contributed equally.
cations from low security applications such as smartphone
unlocking to high security applications such as identity veri-
fication in border crossing. Each of the applications mandate
a chosen way of enrolment to FRS where either a supervised
enrolment is carried out (for instance in on-boarding at
bank premises) or unsupervised enrolment is requested
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(on-boarding for banking from home). While it provides a
high degree of flexibility and convenience to users to use
such FRS in unsupervised manner, this potentially leads
to a security risk. As the subjects are in an unsupervised
setting, a person enrolling into the FRS can employ a face
image which is manipulated, a printed face image, an image
displayed from the electronic screen (e.g., iPad) or a silicone
latex face mask [2]. In order to mitigate such attacks at the
enrolment level, it is therefore essential to have robust attack
detection mechanism. While a number of works have been
proposed on both conducting such attacks and detecting
the attacks in a robust manner for printed attacks, display
attacks and mask attacks in the recent years, we focus our
work on a new kind of attack referred popularly as Morph
Attacks [3].
Face morphing is the process of combining two or more
face images to generate a single face image that can resemble
visually to all the contributing face images to a greater
degree [3]. A good quality morphed face image is also
effective in verifying against all contributing subjects by ob-
taining a comparison score that exceeds the pre-determined
threshold (i.e., passes through FRS) [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. While
morphing can be conducted using multiple face images of
different persons, the effectiveness of morphed image is
reported when the face images of similar ethnicity, gender
and age group are considered [7], [8], [9]. This is primarily
due to the fact that morphed image should not only defeat
the FRS but should also be able to provide high visual
similarity if a manual verification is conducted along with
the FRS.
Face morphing attacks threatens the FRS due to the
current practices in the ID-document application process,
where the biometric enrolment is carried out in an unsu-
pervised manner in many countries. Countries like the UK
and New Zealand allow citizens to upload a digital face
image for various applications such as passport renewal
[10] and visa application [11] in an unsupervised manner.
In a similar manner, many Asian countries and European
countries (e.g. in The Netherlands [12]) request the applicant
to upload a scanned face image for passport/visa/identity-
card applications. Given that the images are submitted in
an unsupervised setting, the applicant has the full access to
upload a morphed image with malicious intent underlining
the need for robust Morphing Attack Detection (MAD)
mechanisms.
1.1 Related Works on Face Morph Generation
While the morphing attacks are studied in the recent years,
most of the attacks are conducted using the morphed images
created using facial landmarks based approaches needing
high degree of supervision to first extract the facial land-
marks, there upon align them and then finally blend them to
generate morphs. The common set of procedures for warp-
ing/blending includes Free Form Deformation (FFD) [13]
[14], Deformation by moving least squares [15], deformation
based on mass spring [16], Bayseian framework based mor-
phing [17] and Delaunay triangulation based morphing [18]
[19] [20] [21] [22] [23]. Due to inadvertent artifacts caused by
pixel/region based morphing, the images need additional
work in refining them to create highly realistic morph im-
ages. A set of post processing steps are usually included as
illustrated in number of works [21] [24] [25]. Generally some
set of post processing techniques such as image smooth-
ing, image sharpening, edge correction, histogram equali-
sation, manual retouching, image enhancement to improve
the brightness and contrast are used to eliminate the the
artefacts generated during morphing process. In a parallel
direction, morphed face images can also be generated using
landmark based methods available in open-source resources
like GIMP/GAP and OpenCV. Morphs generated using
GIMP/GAP technique is more efficient in generating good
quality morphs (i.e., less noticeable artefacts) as pixels are
aligned manually. Despite the minimal amount of effort in
creating morphs using such resources, a significant amount
of efforts need to be dedicated to correct the artifacts.
Additionally, commercial solutions like Face Fusion [26]
and FantaMorph [27] can also generate reasonable quality
morphed images with manual intervention. Although some
steps can be excluded in creating the morphs, it is very
critical to meet the face image quality standards laid out by
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [28] [29]
for electronic Machine Readable Travel Document (eMRTD)
or passport applications.
1.2 GAN Based Face Morph Generation
In an attempt to overcome the cumbersome efforts of
manually creating (semi-automated) the morphed images,
fully automated approach using the Generative Adversarial
Network (GAN) was proposed by Damer et al. [30]. Unlike
the supervision required in extracting and aligning the
face images in manual morphing, GAN based techniques
synthesise morphed images directly by sampling two facial
images in the latent space. In the work by Damer et al.
[30], the proposed MorGAN architecture for morph gener-
ation basically employed a generator constituting encoders,
decoders and a discriminator. The generator was trained
to generate the images with the dimension 64 × 64 pixels
which is a key limiting factor to attack the commercial FRS
given they fail to meet the ICAO standards with minimum
Inter-Eye Distance (IED) of 90 pixels in most countries.
The empirical evaluation of generated morph images using
MorGAN against two commercial FRS indicated that they
fail to meet both quality standards and the verification
performance [1]. Motivated to address the deficiency in
MorGAN architecture, in our recent work [1] 1 we proposed
an approach based on StyleGAN architecture [31] to increase
the spatial dimension to 1024 × 1024 and improved face
quality. Unlike the previous approach of MorGAN [30],
StyleGAN [1] achieves better spatial resolution by embed-
ding the images in the intermediate latent space. With the
increased spatial dimension of resulting morphed images
from our recent architecture, we not only demonstrated
that the images meet quality standards but also have a
reasonable success of attacking the commercial FRS [1].
1.3 Limitations of GAN Based Face Morph Generation
and Our Contributions
While our earlier work [1] indicated that better GAN ar-
chitectures could result in superior quality morphs and
1. The preliminary work results were published at IWBF-2020 in
April, 2020.
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Fig. 2: Details of segmented components in morphs generated by earlier method based on StyleGAN [1] and proposed
MIPGAN (a) StyleGAN [1] (b) MIPGAN-I (c) MIPGAN-II.
could attack the FRS, we also acknowledged the limited
threats to Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) FRS as they
do not succeed fully. Approximately 50% of the generated
morph images were able to verify against contributing sub-
jects making the attack not very effective as noted from
empirical evaluation in our earlier work [1] for a COTS
FRS [32] and an open-source FRS based on ArcFace [33]
unlike the landmark based morph attacks. With a clear
introspection into this aspect, we notice that the resulting
morphed images from our earlier work [1] do not retain
high degree of facial similarity to both contributing subjects.
With lower similarity to contributing subjects in terms of
facial structures, the FRS do not provide high comparison
score to morphed image as anticipated. In other words, the
missing enforcement of identity information of contributing
subjects will lead to high visual quality face image but with
lower face similarity to contributing face images.
In an effort to make the attacks robust such that both the
subjects can be verified with good success rate, in this work,
we extend our previous architecture to generate morphs by
including the identity priors before generation of morphed
faces which we refer as MIPGAN (Morphing through Identity
Prior driven GAN). We propose two variants of our proposed
approach named as MIPGAN-I and MIPGAN-II based on
the employed GAN being StyleGAN or StyleGAN2 [34]
respectively. With the inclusion of a new loss function in our
proposed architecture, we assert to increase the attack suc-
cess rate on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) FRS. Figure 1
shows the example of morphed face images generated using
proposed MIPGAN along with outputs of both the variants.
To further achieve superior quality face morphs, we also
customize the newly designed loss function to account for
ghosting and blurring artifacts in an end-to-end manner
with no human or manual intervention eliminating the need
for high degree of intervention. As noted in Figure 2, the
results from MIPGAN-I and MIPGAN-II is much coherent
in retaining the structural similarity data as compared to
our earlier architecture [1]. With the updated architecture to
generate high quality morphs which preserves both identity
information and structural correspondence, we evaluate
the applicability in creating stronger attacks by creating a
large scale dataset of morphed images by employing the
face images derived from FRGC-V2 face database [35]. The
created dataset of 1270 bona fide images and 2500 morphed
images is first evaluated to measure the attack success rate
by verifying the morphed images against the contributing
subjects using a commercial FRS from Cognitec (FaceVACS-
SDK Version 9.4.2) [32]. Further to measuring the attack
success rate from the digital images, we also extend our
work by printing and scanning (re-digitizing) to check the
consistency of the attack success rate unlike our earlier
work which was limited to investigation on digital images
alone [1]. We also include the experiments on assessing the
impact of compression (to 15kb following ICAO guidelines)
of printed and scanned face images that simulate the real-
life e-passport scenario. The key motivation to extend our
work in this direction is to mimic the passport application
process in many European countries and Asian countries
who accept the printed-and-scanned face images for issuing
the identity document like passports/e-passport.
With the extensive experimental results indicating highly
satisfactory attack success rate, we also evaluate a set of
MAD algorithms to benchmark the detection challenges. To
this extent, we evaluate two state-of-art MAD approaches on
digital morphed images, re-digitized and compressed mor-
phed images after re-digitizing. Thus, we comprehensively
cover the potential morphing attacks in digital domain and
the re-digitized domain. While we note the earlier works [1]
arguing that attacks in digital domain can be detected by
studying the cues such as residual noise in morphing [36],
patterns of noise from morphed images, histogram features
of textures or the deep features [4], we also investigate
the MAD capabilities for re-digitized images which do not
exhibit the similar features (residual noise) as the print-scan
process eliminates the digital cues and presents another set
of variations. Specifically, given the nature of dataset of hav-
ing a single morphed image to be determined as morphed or
bona fide image, we resort to Single Image based MAD (S-
MAD) approaches using two recent but robust approaches
using hybrid and ensemble features [36], [37], [38], [39].
We therefore present a summary of contributions of this
work as listed below:
• We present a novel approach of generating morphed
face images through GAN architecture with enforced
identity priors and a customized novel loss function
to generate highly realistic images which we refer as
MIPGAN (Morphing through Identity Prior driven GAN).
We present two variants of the proposed approach for
generating attacks with high success rate.
• The proposed approach (both variants) is benchmarked
to measure the attack success rate by verifying a
COTS FRS through studying the vulnerability using a
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Fig. 3: Block diagram of the proposed MIPGAN for generating high quality morphed face images
newly generated dataset from our proposed architec-
ture which is referred as MIPGAN Face Morph Dataset.
• Extensive experiments on three different data types
such as (a) digital morphed images (b) print-scan mor-
phed image (c) print-scan morphed images with com-
pression are presented to cover the full spectrum of
passport application process under morphing attacks.
• The generated images are also benchmarked against the
existing MAD approaches both in digital form and the
re-digitized form to provide the insights on detection
challenges of SOTA approaches.
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 describes the new
architecture along with the newly designed loss function to
generate high quality morphs. Section 3 provides the details
on the quantitative experiments indicating the vulnerability
of FRS and the detection challenge. With the set of remarks
and future works in this direction, we draw the conclusion
in Section 5.
2 PROPOSED MORPHED FACE GENERATION
Figure 3 presents the block diagram of the proposed mor-
phed face image generation using MIPGAN. The proposed
method is based on the end-to-end optimisation using a new
loss function that can preserve the identity of the generated
morphed face image through enforced identity priors. The
proposed MIPGAN framework is designed independently
on two different GAN models based on StyleGAN [31] and
StyleGAN2 [34] model. We refer the proposed scheme with
StyleGAN as MIPGAN-I and with StyleGAN2 as MIPGAN-
II respectively. Given the face images from the accomplice
(I1) (contributing subject 1) and the malicious (I2) (con-
tributing subject 2) data subjects, we predict the corre-
sponding latent vectors L
′
1 and L
′
2 in the first step. In this
work, we have employed a latent prediction network based
on the pretrained model using ResNet50 and several tree
connected layers [40]. The latent prediction network takes
an image as an input and predicts the corresponding latent
vector in specific StyleGAN [31] and StyleGAN2 [34] model.
The predicted latent vectors thus provide the initialization
for the morphed face generation that is obtained using a
weighted linear average of L
′
1 and L
′
2 as follows:
L
′
M =
w1 ∗ L′1 + w2 ∗ L
′
2
2
(1)
Where w1 and w2 indicate the weights, which we have
chosen to be w1 = w2 = 1. Equal weights are selected
as shown in earlier work [41] that, the morphing images
generated with equal weights can indicate higher vulner-
ability to COTS FRS. Finally, L
′
M is passed through the
synthesis network (independently for StyleGAN [31] and
StyleGAN2 [34] model) to generate the corresponding mor-
phed image I
′
M that has a resolution of 1024 × 1024 pixels.
The generated morphed face image I
′
M is then optimised
using the proposed loss function to generate the high quality
morphed face image. In the following section, we discuss
the loss function to optimise the latent vector obtained using
Equation 1.
2.1 Proposed Loss Function
The proposed loss function is based on both perceptual
fidelity, quality and identity factor that can facilitate the high
quality face morph generation. The common issue with the
GAN based morph generation is the presence of the ghost
artifacts and the blurring issues. We employ the perceptual
loss with multiple layers to eliminate such effects as given
by Eqn 2.
LossPerceptual =
1
2
∑
i
1
Ni
||Fi(I1)− Fi(I ′M )||22
+
1
2
∑
i
1
Ni
||Fi(I2)− Fi(I ′M )||22
(2)
where Ni denotes the number of features in layer i and F
denotes features in layer i of the perceptual network (VGG-
16 in our case). We choose conv11, conv12, conv22, conv33
inspired by [42] for the combination of perceptual layers.
Compared with the original combination of layers conv12,
conv22, conv33, conv43 [43], our design measures low-level
features instead of high-level features like style of an image
and is closer to our goal of morphing faces with high quality.
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The main goal of this paper is to generate the morphed
face images that can significantly attack FRS. In order to
achieve this, we have introduced the identity loss function
based on the feedback from FRS. We employ Arcface [33] - a
deep learning based FRS because of its robust and accurate
performance to obtain the feedback on generated morphed
face. Specifically, we employ a pretrained embedding ex-
tractor with ResNet50 as the backbone to extract the unit
embedding vectors and define the identity loss by their
cosine distance to improve the morph generation process
as given by Eqn 3.
LossIdentity =
(1− ~v1·~vM‖~v1‖‖~vM‖ ) + (1− ~v2·~vM‖~v2‖‖~vM‖ )
2
(3)
where ~v1, ~v2, ~vM respectively denotes the embedding vec-
tors which are extracted from image I1, I2, I
′
M respectively.
To further prove the loss function is differential for the
morphed embedding vector ~vM , we define xd, yd, zd to be
the value of vector ~v1, ~v2, ~vM in dimension d respectively
and d′ 6= d to be other dimensions except d. The expanded
identity loss function and its partial derivative are:
LossIdentity =
(1−
∑
d xdzd
‖~v1‖‖~vM‖ ) + (1−
∑
d ydzd
‖~v2‖‖~vM‖ )
2
, (4)
∂LossIdentity
∂zd
= 1− xd
2‖~v1‖
∂
∂zd
(
zd√
z2d +
∑
d′ 6=d z
2
d′
)
− yd
2‖~v2‖
∂
∂zd
(
zd√
z2d +
∑
d′ 6=d z
2
d′
),
(5)
∂
∂zd
(
zd√
z2d +
∑
d′ 6=d z
2
d′
) =
1√
z2d +
∑
d′ 6=d z
2
d′
+
2z2d
−2(z2d +
∑
d′ 6=d z
2
d′)
3
2
=
∑
d′ 6=d z
2
d′
(z2d +
∑
d′ 6=d z
2
d′)
3
2
,
∂LossIdentity
∂zd
= 1−
( xd2‖~v1‖ +
yd
2‖~v2‖ )
∑
d′ 6=d z
2
d′
(z2d +
∑
d′ 6=d z
2
d′)
3
2
. (6)
For any value zd = z′d, it is obvious that:
lim
∆zd→0
∂LossIdentity(z
′
d + ∆zd)
∂zd
= lim
∆zd→0
(1−
( xd2‖~v1‖ +
yd
2‖~v2‖ )
∑
d′ 6=d z
2
d′
((z′d + ∆zd)2 +
∑
d′ 6=d z
2
d′)
3
2
)
= 1−
( xd2‖~v1‖ +
yd
2‖~v2‖ )
∑
d′ 6=d z
2
d′
(z
′2
d +
∑
d′ 6=d z
2
d′)
3
2
=
∂LossIdentity(z
′
d)
∂zd
.
Hence, for any dimension of d, the partial derivative of
the identity loss function is continuous. Because the partial
derivative with respect to each dimension is continuous,
the identity loss function is differentiable for the morphed
embedding vector. As we have preprocessed the embedding
vectors to be unit vectors, it is even simple to make the proof
for our model.
It is interesting to note that the identity loss based on
the Arcface feature extractor model is trained to maximize
the face class separability and thus is more sensitive to face
attributes. Hence, only optimizing the identity loss cannot
achieve the same reconstruction performance as the percep-
tual loss but applying it on the face region can effectively
control the generated attributes to be recognized as both
subjects.
To solve the imbalance between different subjects, we
introduce an identity difference loss as given by Eqn 7.
LossID−Diff = |(1− ~v1 · ~vM‖~v1‖‖~vM‖ )− (1−
~v2 · ~vM
‖~v2‖‖~vM‖ )|. (7)
With the idea of Lagrange multiplier, it adds a constraint
to the optimisation process to force the cosine distance
between morph embedding and each of the two reference
embeddings to be the same. Since LossID−Diff is usually
small with value less than 1, we apply L1 loss on the
difference of two cosine distance terms to avoid vanishing
gradient problem.
Finally, in order to improve the structural visibility of the
generated morphed face image, we also apply the Multi-
Scale Structural Similarity (MS-SSIM) loss LMS−SSIM to
measure the structure similarity [44]. Given two discrete
non-negative signals (images in our case) x and y, lumi-
nance, contrast and structure comparison measures were
given by l, c, s as computed using Eqn 8.
l(x, y) =
(2µx2µy + (K1L)
2)
µ2x + µ
2
y + (K1L)
2
,
c(x, y) =
(2σx2σy + (K2L)
2)
σ2x + σ
2
y + (K2L)
2
,
s(x, y) =
(σxy +
(K2L)
2
2 )
σxσy +
(K2L)2
2
,
(8)
where µx, σx and σxy denotes the mean of x, the variance
of x and the covariance of x and y respectively. L is the
dynamic range of the signal and K1  1,K2  1 are two
constant scalars. The MS-SSIM loss LMS−SSIM is further
defined by Eqn 9.
LMS−SSIM = [lJ(x, y)]αJ ·
J∏
j=1
[cj(x, y)]
βj [sj(x, y)]
γj (9)
where j = 1, 2, . . . , J represents the j-th scale and αj , βj
and γj are the factors of relative importance. As suggested
in [44], we also set αj = βj = γj ,
∑J
j=1 γj = 1 and use
the resulting parameters β1 = γ1 = 0.0448, β2 = γ2 =
0.2856, β3 = γ3 = 0.3001, β4 = γ4 = 0.2363, α5 = β5 =
γ5 = 0.1333.
Thus, the proposed loss function can be formulated as:
Loss = λ1LossPerceptual + λ2LossIdentity
+ λ3LossMS−SSIM + λ4LossID−Diff ,
(10)
where λ1, λ2, λ3 and λ4 are the hyper-parameters that are
set to achieve both stable and generalised convergence. In
this work, we empirically set λ1 = 0.0002, λ2 = 10, λ3 = 1
and λ4 = 1.
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2.2 Training and Optimisation
The training and optimisation of the proposed method are
carried out on Tensorflow version 1.13 and version 1.14 for
StyleGAN and StyleGAN2, respectively. The optimisation
is carried out using NVIDIA GTX 1070 8 GB GPU with
CUDA version 10.0 and CUDNN version 7.5 and NVIDIA
Tesla P100 PCIE 16 GB GPU. The Adam optimiser with
hyper-parameters β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999 and  = 1 × 10−8
as recommended in the original paper [45] is employed
on this work. The list of morphing pairs is generated in
advance with careful considerations to gender. During each
optimisation process of 150 iterations, the learning rate is
initially set to η = 0.03 with an exponential decay per 6
iterations of ηnew = η ∗ 0.95.
Figure 4 illustrates the qualitative results of the proposed
MIPGAN framework based on StyleGAN and StyleGAN2.
Further, the qualitative results of the existing methods based
on StyleGAN [1] and MorGAN [30] is provided alongside
for the convenience of the reader in the same figure. It is
interesting to note that the proposed MIPGAN generated
face morph images indicates both perceptual and geometric
features correspondence to both contributing subjects (for
instance, malicious actor and accomplice).
3 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
This section presents and discusses the experimental pro-
tocols, datasets, and quantitative results of the proposed
face morphing technique. The images generated from pro-
posed MIPGAN-I and MIPGAN-II architectures are com-
pared with the state-of-the-art techniques based on both
facial landmarks [8] and StyleGAN based morph generation
[1]. The effectiveness of the face morphing generation tech-
niques is quantitatively evaluated by bench-marking the
vulnerability of the COTS FRS for generated morphed face
images. Further, we also evaluate the morph attack detection
potential by evaluating the generated morphed face images
using the most recent and robust MAD techniques.
3.1 MIPGAN Face Morph Dataset
We employ the face images from FRGC-V2 face database
[35] to generate the MIPGAN Face Morph Dataset consisting
of morphed face images using both state-of-the-art and the
proposed MIPGAN technique. We have selected 140 unique
data subjects from the FRGC dataset by considering the
high-quality face images captured in constrained conditions
that resemble the passport image quality. Among 140 data
subjects, the 47 data subjects are female and 93 data subjects
are male. Each data subject has a variable size of 7-21
additional captures making the whole dataset to have 1270
samples corresponding to 140 data subjects. We employ two
different face morph generation techniques based on Facial
landmarks constrained by Delaunay triangles with blending
[8] and StyleGAN [1]. We do not consider MorGAN [30] [46]
based face morph generation as it was earlier demonstrated
that MorGAN does not generate ICAO compliant images
and thus makes COTS FRS not vulnerable [1]. All the
samples are pre-processed to meet the ICAO standards [29]
and morphing is carried out by following the guidelines
outlined earlier [8] [9], i.e, careful selection of subjects based
on age, gender and comparison score using FRS to make
attacks realistic.
To effectively evaluate the proposed method’s quanti-
tative performance and the existing techniques, we create
three different types of attacks from morphed images, such
as Digital morphed images: Morphed face images that are
obtained from morph generation process in the digital do-
main. Print-scanned morphed images: The digital morphed
images are printed and then scanned (or re-digitized) to sim-
ulate the passport application process. We have employed
DNP-DS820 [47] dye-sublimation photo printer to generate
the print of the digital morphed and bona fide face images
in this work. The use of a dye-sublimation photo printer
guarantees high-quality photo printing (generally used for
a passport application) and makes sure that printed photos
are free from dotted patterns (or individual droplets of ink)
that are resulting from the printing process of conventional
printers. Each of these printed photos is then scanned (or
re-digitized) using the Canon office scanner to have 300 dpi
as suggested in ICAO standards [29]. Print-scanned com-
pressed morphed images: The printed and scanned images
(both morphed and bona fide) are compressed to have a size
of 15kb that makes it suitable to store in the e-passport. This
Morphs generated 
Contributing 
Subject 1
Proposed morphing technique
(a) (b) (c) (d)
MIPGAN-I MIPGAN-II
Contributing 
Subject 2
Fig. 4: Qualitative results of proposed MIPGAN together with existing GAN based face morph generation methods (a)
Facial landmarks [8] (b) StyleGAN [1] (c) MorGAN [30] (d) Proposed method
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Fig. 5: Illustration of morphing in digital, print-scan and print-scan compression data (a) Contributing subject 1 (b) Facial
landmarks [8] (c) StyleGAN [1] (d) MIPGAN-I (e) MIPGAN-II (f) Contributing subject 2
process reflects the real-life scenario of face image storage
in passport systems. Thus, the overall dataset has 2500 ×
3 (types of morph data) × 4 types of morph generation
technique = 30, 000 morph samples and 1270 × 3 (types
of morph data) × 4 types of morph generation technique =
15, 240 bona fide samples. Figure 5 illustrates the three data
types of attacks that are used to evaluate the effectiveness
of the proposed method and the existing methods of face
morph generation. It is evident that the visual quality of the
images vary largely for different attack types (for instance,
the digital data attack indicates the best quality and print-
scan with compression indicates the lowest quality).
3.2 Vulnerability Analysis
In order to evaluate the applicability of proposed approach
in devising efficient attacks on FRS, we measure the attack
success on a COTS-FRS provided by Cognitec. The Cognitec
FRS (Version 9.4.2) has an operational threshold of 0.5 to
successfully verify a given data subject under the consid-
eration at False Accept Rate (FAR) of 0.1% following the
guidelines of Frontex [48]. In this work, we have considered
only the COTS to evaluate the vulnerability motivated from
our earlier work [1] where COTS was shown to be highly
vulnerable when compared with deep learning FRS. Further,
we have also used the open-source deep learning based FRS
using Arcface [33] to achieve the identity prior in association
with the proposed method and to avoid any bias introduced
by deep learning model already used for morph generation
process, we employ COTS alone to report the vulnerability
2.
The vulnerability is assessed using two metrics of Mated
Morphed Presentation Match Rate (MMPMR) [9] and Fully
Mated Morphed Presentation Match Rate (FMMPMR) [1]
based on the threshold provided by Cognitec FRS. For a
given morph image MI1,2 obtained using two subjects, we
compute the vulnerability by enrolling MI1,2 and verifying
it against the corresponding contributing subjects I1 and I2.
The obtained comparison scores S1 and S2 for both images
I1 and I2 against the morphed image MI1,2 indicates the
threat to FRS, if and only if both S1 and S2 cross the preset
verification threshold at FAR = 0.1%. The corresponding
metric FMMPMR [1] [41] is therefore computed as:
FMMPMR
=
1
P
∑
M,P
(S1PM > τ)&&(S2
P
M > τ) . . .&&(Sk
P
M > τ)
(11)
2. COTS evaluation also reflects the operational evaluation where
open-source systems are typically employed, for instance in NIST FRVT
tests.
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Fig. 6: Vulnerability analysis using COTS-FRS on digital dataset (a) Face landmarks [8] (b) StyleGAN [1] (c) Proposed
Method
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Fig. 7: Vulnerability analysis using COTS-FRS on print-scan dataset (a) Face landmarks [8] (b) StyleGAN [1] (c) Proposed
Method
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Fig. 8: Vulnerability analysis using COTS-FRS on print-scan compression dataset (a) Face landmarks [8] (b) StyleGAN [1]
(c) Proposed Method
Where P = 1, 2, . . . , p represent the number of attempts
made by presenting all probe images of the contributing
subjects againstM th morphed image,K = 1, 2, . . . , k repre-
sents the number of composite image constitute to generate
the morphing image (in our case K = 2), SkPM represents
the comparison score of the Kth contributing subject ob-
tained with P th attempt corresponding to M th morphing
image and τ represents the threshold value corresponding
to FAR = 0.1%. The images not meeting such a requirement
laid by FMMPMR is discarded to make the new dataset
robust and applicable to realistic operational research. In
order to also establish the relevance with respect to earlier
metric, we also provide the vulnerability using MMPMR [9].
The obtained success rate, or alternatively the vulnerability
of FRS is provided in Table 1.
Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8 shows the scatter plots
of the comparison scores obtained using COTS FRS. The
horizontal and the vertical red lines in the figures indicate
the threshold set at FAR = 0.1%. The Figure 6, Figure 7
and Figure 8 can be interpreted using four different quad-
rants. The first quadrant (bottom left quadrant) indicates
the morphed image being not verified for both contributing
data subjects. Thus, the large number the comparison scores
in the first quadrant indicates that the morph generation
method is not strong enough to deceive the COTS FRS.
The second quadrant (top left quadrant) indicates the mor-
phed image being verified to data subject-2 (one of the
contributing subjects) only. The third quadrant (top right
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Morph generation type
MMPMR(%) FMMPMR(%) MMPMR(%) FMMPMR(%) MMPMR(%) FMMPMR(%)
Digital Print-Scan Print-Scan with compression
Male Male Male
Facial Landmark 100 98.77 97.23 97.34 97.38 96.95
StyleGAN 63.51 41.27 60.59 39.51 57.12 35.05
MIPGAN-I 93.35 83.08 91.72 80.55 91.07 77.89
MIPGAN-II 92.22 80.45 90.74 77.67 89.16 73.47
Female Female Female
Facial Landmark 100 99.26 99.37 99.02 99.78 99.24
StyleGAN 68.75 42.62 66.45 42.01 66.45 40.49
MIPGAN-I 98.57 93.11 98.16 91.22 96.12 90.52
MIPGAN-II 95.91 87.66 95.30 86.26 94.69 84.47
Combined Combined Combined
Facial Landmark 100 98.84 97.64 97.60 97.84 97.30
StyleGAN 64.68 41.49 61.72 39.90 58.92 35.89
MIPGAN-I 94.36 84.65 92.97 82.23 92.29 79.88
MIPGAN-II 92.93 81.59 80.56 79.02 90.24 75.20
TABLE 1: Quantitative evaluation of vulnerability of FRS from various morph generation approaches
quadrant) indicates that the morphed image being verified
to both the contributing data subjects (subject-1 and subject-
2). Thus, the larger the number of comparison scores in
this quadrant indicates higher vulnerability of COTS FRS.
The fourth quadrant (bottom right quadrant) indicates the
morphed image being verified as data subject-1 only.
As noted from the Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8, the
dataset generated from the proposed approach (MIPGAN-
I and MIPGAN-II) has high attack success as compared to
competing method obtained using StyleGAN alone. How-
ever, it has to be noted that the dataset generated from
proposed approach is highly similar to attacks from land
mark based morph attacks. Further, it is interesting to note
that the images obtained from the proposed approach is
equally threatening the FRS in digital domain, re-digitized
domain and compressed images after re-digitizing exempli-
fying no deterioration of attack threat due to print-scan or
compression process.
As it can be noted from the Table 1, the FRS system is
vulnerable to proposed attack generation mechanism to a
higher degree as compared to its counterpart StyleGAN [1]
approach while having similar performance to facial land-
mark based approach [8]. While it can also be noted that the
FMMPMR is lower than MMPMR consistently as FMMPMR
imposes strict selection of attack images unlike MMPMR.
MIPGAN-I based morphed images shows the marginally
better performance in attacking the FRS as compared to
images generated by MIPGAN-II.
3.3 Morph Attack Detection Potential
Considering the success rate of the newly generated dataset,
we naturally choose to evaluate the morphing attack detec-
tion performance to also validate the robustness of existing
MAD mechanism. Morph Attack Detection has been widely
addressed in the literature by developing the MAD tech-
niques based on both deep learning [49], [50], [23], [51] [52]
[53] and non-deep learning [54] [20] [55] [56] approaches
. Owing to the recent works detailing the applicability of
Hybrid features [37] and Ensemble features [38] in detecting
the morph attacks, we choose to bench-mark both Hybrid
features [37] and Ensemble features [38]. While the Hybrid
features [37] resort to extracting features using both scale
space and color space combined with multiple classifiers,
Ensemble features [38] employ a variety of textural features
in conjunction with set of classifiers. In commonality, both
the approaches evaluate a wide variety of MAD mechanism
reported so far in a holistic manner supported by empirical
results [37], [38]. In addition, the Hybrid features [37] is also
validated against the ongoing NIST FRVT morph challenge
dataset [39] with best performance in detecting printed and
scanned morph images justifying our selection of algorithm
to benchmark the newly composed database.
The performance of the MAD is presented using the ISO-
IEC metrics [57] using Attack Presentation Classification
Error Rate (APCER (%)) which defines the proportion of
attack images (morph images) incorrectly classified as bona
fide images and Bona fide Presentation Classification Error
Rate (BPCER (%)) in which bona fide images incorrectly
classified as attack images [57] along with the Detection
Equal Error Rate (D-EER (%)). To evaluate the generated
morphed face image’s attack potential, we have sub-divided
the newly generated database into two sets for training and
testing that consists of independent data subjects with no
overlap between the splits. The training set includes 690
bona fide images and 1190 morphed images. The testing set
consists of 580 bona fide and 1310 morphed images. Table
2 presents the set of results obtained on all three different
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Fig. 9: Example of morphing images failed to attack FRS (a) morphed face images generated using proposed MIPGAN-I
(b) morphed face images generated using proposed MIPGAN-II
subsets (or types) of data obtained using the proposed
morph generation methods.
Noting the results from Table 2, we make some concrete
observations as listed below:
• The morph attack images stemming from landmark
based morphs can be detected with a good success
rate (with less than 2% error for re-digitized and com-
pressed images).
• The attack images created using Style-GAN and pro-
posed MIPGAN can be efficiently detected using both
the employed approaches with high accuracy.
• Despite the approaches performing with very high ac-
curacy, we cautiously also note the missing study tar-
geting multiple printers and scanners. Such as variation
of different printers and scanners may challenge the
employed MAD mechanism needing future works to
investigate this further.
4 LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT WORK AND POTEN-
TIAL FUTURE WORKS
Despite the work presenting a new and robust approach to
generate the morph attacks which is empirically evaluated
using COTS FRS, this work has few noted limitations. In
the current scope of work, we evaluate the impact of print
and scan (re-digitizing) using one printer reflecting realistic
scenario. The MAD mechanism employed in this work has
not investigated wide range of printers and scanners that
may impact the MAD performance. While we assert that
the MAD performance may not vary extremely due to
wider combination of printers and scanners, the empirical
evaluation is yet to be conducted in future works.
As a second aspect, the proposed approach needs pre-
selection of ethnicity for generating stronger attacks. Figure
9 shows the example morph face images generated using
the proposed method using MIPGAN-I and MIPGAN-II
that fail to get verified to contributing subjects when eth-
nicity pre-selection is not performed [8]. We notice that the
selection of contributing subject plays an important role
with the proposed method to generate stronger attacks with
MIPGAN. It is our assertion that the selection of contribut-
ing subjects with similar geometric structure (particularly
ethnicity) can improve the performance of the proposed
system, but needs further investigation.
Despite our extensive experiments on MAD, another
limitation is the missing study on pure generalization aspect
by investigating the pre-trained MAD mechanism on the
newly generated dataset. Such a study will also reveal the
Morph Generation Type MAD Algorithms
D-EER(%)
BPCER @ APCER =
D-EER(%)
BPCER @ APCER =
D-EER(%)
BPCER @ APCER =
5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10%
Digital Print-Scan Print-Scan with compression
Facial LandMarks [8]
Hybrid Features [37] 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.85 0.85 0.34 2.25 1.12 0.51
Ensemble Features [38] 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.35 1.45 0.96 2.58 1.71 1.54
StyleGan [1]
Hybrid Features [37] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ensemble Features [38] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MIPGAN-I
Hybrid Features [37] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ensemble Features [38] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MIPGAN-II
Hybrid Features [37] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ensemble Features [38] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TABLE 2: Quantitative performance of different MAD algorithms on MIPGAN Morph Face dataset
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scaling capability of existing MAD mechanism for newer
attacks from GAN in addition to training the MAD from
the GAN attack data and this has to be considered in future
works in this direction.
5 CONCLUSION
Addressing the limitations of generating the robust morph
attacks using GAN, we have proposed a new architecture
for generating morph attacks in this work. The proposed
approach (MIPGAN with two variants) for devising robust
morphing attacks uses identity prior driven GAN with a
customized loss exploiting perceptual quality and identity
factors to generate realistic images that can threaten FRS
greatly. To validate the new attack generation approach’s
attack potential, we have created a new dataset consisting
of 30, 000 morphed images and 15, 240 bona fide images. A
COTS FRS was evaluated empirically to measure the success
rate of the new approach and vulnerability was reported
indicating the applicability of the new approach and newly
generated database. In a similar direction, the dataset is also
validated for detection performance by studying two state-
of-art MAD mechanisms. Despite the high attack detection
success rate by employed MAD, we note that the morphed
images generated by MIPGAN can severely threaten FRS in
a present state without MAD in FRS.
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